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Hold Your Horses: Temporal Multiplexity and Conflict 
Moderation in the “Palio di Siena” (1743-2010) 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper elaborates the concept of “temporal multiplexity”, defined as the overlaying of ties of 
different duration, such as transient employment and enduring organizational ties. This concept is 
instrumental in resolving long-standing challenges in network research, such as capturing the interplay 
between different levels of analysis or time horizons. This is made possible by longitudinal network 
and mobility data (1743-2010) from the “Palio di Siena”– the famous horse race in Siena, Italy. The 
outcome of interest is Palio-related collective violence. The analysis shows that relationally-loaded 
organizational ties of rivalry or friendship increase the likelihood of incidents, while mobility along 
the same lines reduces it. The results support sociological arguments that symmetrical social space of 
friendship or rivalry is conducive to conflict. Mobility is a factor of moderation – by connecting 
employers within the actor and transferring relational content between them, it creates misalignment 
between the assumption of a role and fulfillment of its expectations. Mobility relaxes the relational 
constraints of jockeys, reducing their compliance with aggressive demands. The uncertainty resulting 
from mobility may have a collective benefit that is ignored by employers – the moderation of conflict. 
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Introduction 
Representing the dynamic nature of relationships is essential in network research. Networks build up 
as layer upon layer, with past interactions enabling and constraining current exchanges (Kilduff, Tsai 
and Hanke 2006, Quintane and Carnabuci 2016). A key challenge in this regard is explaining how the 
temporal embeddedness of relations defines a dynamic social space, empirically capturing it through 
the sequence of relations over time (Moody, McFarland and Bender-deMoll 2005).   
 In this paper we posit multiplexity as instrumental in addressing this challenge. Multiplexity – 
the existence of ‘‘multiple bases for interaction’’ with network contacts (Wasserman and Faust 1994) 
is pervasive. Most relationships overlay exchanges in different domains, such as friendship between 
co-workers (Shipilov and Li 2012, Shipilov, Gulati, Kilduff, Li and Tsai 2014). Multiplexity is 
typically presented as a reinforcing factor – by adding depth to relationships (Smith and Papachristos 
2016), it reduces their vulnerability to dissolution (Gould 1991, Kadushin 2012) and enhances network 
resilience (Kenis and Knoke 2002). But the emphasis on its reinforcing aspects may be theoretically 
and empirically constraining. As Kuwabara, Luo and Sheldon (2010) observe, the concept is 
theoretically richer than how it is generally used, inviting more attention to multiplexity as a process.  
A valuable guideline in this regard is provided by Shipilov et al. (2014), referring to “temporal 
multiplexity” to denote the overlaying of relations over time. The assumption is that relational events 
have a residue that extends beyond their occurrence (Moody et al. 2005). For example, a personal tie 
resulting from a career move between two firms may lead to the creation of a buyer–supplier tie 
(Somaya, Williamson, and Lorinkova 2008). In the interpersonal context, “ghost ties” to individuals 
who have left an organization may exert long-lasting influence (Kilduff et al. 2006). What is common 
to these cases is the enduring influence of a past tie, even if formally dissolved. Past research suggests 
that the overlying of ties of different duration may modify network processes and outcomes (Ahuja et 
al. 2012, Quintane and Carnabuci 2016), but provides little evidence for it. Accordingly, Shipilov et al. 
(2014: 455) call for research that explores how temporal multiplexity shapes behavior and illustrates 
the mechanisms involved in the dynamic overlaying of distinct types of ties. This is the objective that 
motivates our analysis. 
 Our main contribution is in clarifying and extending the concept of temporal multiplexity to  
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facilitate its application in network and organizational scholarship. If prior definitions of temporal 
multiplexity refer to the influence of past (discontinued) ties on present ties at one level of analysis 
(e.g. Shipilov et al. 2014), we extend the concept to different levels of analysis (i.e. individual and 
organizational networks) and different time scales (i.e. different rates of tie formation and decay). 
Defining temporal multiplexity as the overlaying of relationships of different duration, we examine 
how the co-existence of transient employment relationships and enduring organizational relationships 
between employers affects a key relational outcome – the escalation of conflict. To this end, we use 
longitudinal network and mobility data from the “Palio di Siena”, the famous horse race in Siena, 
Italy. Held since the Middle Ages, the Palio features intense, long-lasting rivalries and alliances 
between city neighborhoods (Silverman 1979, Dundes and Falassi 1975). The careers of jockeys 
unfold through sequences of temporary moves that overlay personal ties onto organizational ties of 
alliance and rivalry. 
 The analysis of the overlaying of transient employment ties onto enduring organizational ties 
is important for two reasons. First, by featuring temporal discrepancies, it introduces tension and 
misalignment, allowing to better adapt the concept of multiplexity to conditions of uncertainty and risk 
(Smith and Papachristos 2016: 20). The results indicate that temporal multiplexity promotes the 
misalignment between the assumption of roles and the fulfillment of expectations associated with 
them, reducing the propensity to execute conflict-inducing demands that target a former employer. 
 Second, temporal multiplexity is useful in capturing multi-level dynamics, exemplifying the 
benefits of simultaneously considering processes at the individual and network level (Ibarra, Kilduff 
and Tsai 2005, Moliterno and Mahony 2011, Cattani, Ferriani and Lanza 2017). The analysis attests 
that the interplay between individuals and groups and between collaboration and antagonism is vital to 
understanding social systems (Simmel 1955, Ibarra et al. 2005). This interplay transpires in the finding 
that relationally-loaded organizational ties lead to the escalation of conflict, while career moves along 
the same lines have a tempering effect. What makes the domain of conflict appropriate to our research 
objective is its relational and multi-level nature – networks of social relations link macro-level conflict 
to local, individual interactions (Gould 2003, p. 151). Conflict is pervasive in business, ranging from 
litigation between firms, through “cutthroat” competition to public campaigns to forestall takeovers 
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(Granovetter 1985, p. 501). Mobilizing ties beyond the focal dyad (Sytch and Tatarynowicz 2014) and 
across levels of analysis (Grohsjean, Kober and Zucchini 2016) is crucial in forestalling the escalation 
of conflict between organizations. 
Multiplexity and Conflict 
A basic sociological observation is that social conflict is a relational phenomenon (Simmel 1955, 
Collins 2012) emerging “deterministically from the web of relationships governing social life” (Gould 
1999: 358). A key relational factor of conflict is the interdependence of collaborative and antagonistic 
relationships (Gould 2003). The complex, non-linear nature of this interdependence (Sytch and 
Tatarynowicz 2014) explains the difficulties in modeling the escalation of conflict from individual to 
collective levels – a theoretical problem with no straightforward solution (Gould 1999, 2000). 
 The nature of these difficulties can be illustrated through the operation of a core mechanism of 
conflict regulation, based on network multiplexity. There is evidence that by stacking different types 
of relationships, such as affective and professional ties, multiplexity provides a foundation for trust 
that can reduce uncertainty, increase reciprocity and mobilize collective action (Brass, Galaskiewicz, 
Greve and Tsai 2004, Kadushin 2012, Gondal and McLean 2013). By enhancing alignment between 
the interests of parties and between formal and informal networks, multiplexity reinforces conformity 
to exchange norms (Uzzi 1996, 1999) and to demands for collective solidarity (Gould 1991). If it 
succeeds at intimidating one’s adversaries into retreating, the mobilization of support may lead to the 
prevention of escalation of conflict (Granovetter 1985, Collins 2012, Gould 1999, 2000). 
However, studies also demonstrate that by reinforcing relationships, multiplexity can be a 
factor of polarization, locking actors into fixed roles and imposing on them demands for collective 
solidarity (e.g., Padgett and Ansell 1993, Gould 1999). As Gould (1991) shows, the multiplexity of 
social networks can contribute to the escalation of collective violence, as it reinforces the loyalty of 
participants. In conditions of polarization, network multiplexity encourages the manifestation of 
collective solidarity, thereby reducing the ability of actors to deviate from role expectations that 
contradict their individual interests (Gould 1999, 2000). Thus, non-conformity to role expectations and 
demands for solidarity is an important precondition for de-escalation of conflict (Gould 2000). 
6 
We suggest that one way to resolve this conundrum is by introducing mobility in a framework 
that is still focused on the overlaying of ties of comparable time horizons. To this end, we elaborate 
the concept of temporal multiplexity – the overlaying of transient employment relationships onto 
cooperative or antagonistic inter-organizational relationships. This type of multiplexity is distinct from 
the classic one, as it features discrepancies in the duration of overlaid relationships. As observed by 
Kuwabara et al. (2010), the tendency to examine ties of similar nature or duration in multiplexity 
accounts carries the risk of obfuscating possibilities for distinct types of relationships to combine and 
blend. We explore these possibilities by analyzing career mobility and the overlaying of transient 
employment onto enduring organizational relationships. 
It is recognized in network scholarship that career mobility represents a key intersection of 
personal and organizational networks (Shipilov et al. 2014). Studies show that mobility creates short-
term volatility in networks that is disruptive of routines (Broschak 2004, Wezel, Cattani and Pennings 
2006), but may be beneficial in the long run by embedding the past employer in a mobility network, 
where information is shared more broadly (Dokko and Rosenkopf 2010, Shipilov et al. 2014). What is 
less recognized, however, is that by spanning personal and organizational networks, mobility also 
creates transient ties between organizations, providing an opportunity to understand how temporal 
discrepancies may create tension at the individual and organizational levels. We still have limited 
understanding of how ties at different levels of analysis or with different time scales (speed of 
evolution) coexist and influence each other.1     
Mobility is a context that lends itself particularly well to representing the duality of network 
affiliation (Breiger 1974). When changing jobs, an employee creates a relationship between past and 
present employers. But a career move simultaneously connects employers within the actor, overlaying 
the new affiliation on top of the old one. This duality is illustrated in Figure 1. A triad is formed upon 
the completion of a career move, connecting the employee to both the current employer j (“present” 
personal tie) and the past employer i (“past” personal tie). Employers i and j may in turn be connected 
through an organizational tie (e.g., an alliance or a rivalry). The represented configuration of temporal 
                                                        
1 We are grateful to a reviewer for this observation and for focusing our attention on this aspect of multiplexity.  
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multiplexity features two types of temporal overlay: between personal and organizational ties (a1 and 
a2) and between present and past personal ties (b). If in practice these are interwoven, it is important 
to differentiate between them for analytical purposes. In this framework the mobility of an employee 
connects her present to the past, but also overlays personal on organizational relationships (a1 and a2). 
Hence, employees need to align past and current affiliations with the extant organizational relationship 
between employers.  
------Insert Figure 1 here ------ 
The triad represented on Figure 1 creates preconditions for misalignment between past and 
present affiliations, particularly when past and present employers are connected by a collaborative or 
antagonistic organizational tie. Situations of having a positive experience with a former employer, 
who is a rival of the current one or negative experience with a collaborator of the current employer are 
a source of tension for employees (Clark 1984, Conroy and O’Leary-Kelly 2014). Research attests that 
this kind of tension is not rare, and that success at managing multiplex ties requires reconciling 
conflicting role expectations that may foster misalignment between affective components of personal 
relations and the pursuit of instrumental goals (Verbrugge 1979, Ingram and Zou 2008). 
Misalignment is generally presented in negative light, but in our study it is accorded a positive 
function as a factor of conflict de-escalation. The overlaying of career mobility on organizational 
networks may create tension between the demands of the employer and the interests of the employee, 
thereby reducing the “ecological control” (Padgett 1981) over individual behavior. We contend that 
the misalignment of interests has a positive function when serving to reduce role conformity – the 
probability that actors conform to role expectations when so demanded. As we intend to demonstrate, 
this misalignment makes actors less willing or less capable of implementing the conflict-inducing 
demands of their employers, thus reducing the likelihood of conflict. 
These expectations are aligned with the view that behavior is shaped by the structural context 
within which individuals are embedded, but also by idiosyncratic cognitions and memories (Ibarra et 
al. 2005). Networks exist simultaneously as layers of relations and cognitive constructs, constituted in 
the minds of individuals as memories of past states and hopes of future states (Emirbayer and Mische 
1998). In this logic, the past and present have a cognitive link – the history of networks is retained in 
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the selective memories of its members, which conditions network-level outcomes (Kilduff et al. 2006). 
This link is manifested when connections to past nodes continue as an active force within the network, 
even after the end of the relationship (Ibarra et al. 2005, Kilduff et al. 2006). For example, ties to past 
employers may continue exerting influence after the termination of employment (Godart, Shipilov and 
Claes 2014). As scholars observe, career mobility is rarely unproblematic; the process of “becoming 
an ex” is not a matter of adapting to a clear role, but a process of negotiation or reconciliation between 
work-related identities (Ebaugh 1988, Ibarra 2003). These transitional states represent a valuable 
source of insights for scholarship on networks (Ibarra et al. 2005). 
The concept of temporal multiplexity is well-suited to these transitional states. Its significance 
lies in providing a concise representation of the dynamic and multi-level nature of networks. These are 
inherently related – as Kozlowski and Klein (2000) note, time is an important, but still underdeveloped 
component of multilevel models. In this light, the analysis of temporal multiplexity can be valuable in 
identifying how bottom-up effects of career mobility impact higher-level outcomes. As an illustration 
of the potential of this approach, we develop a set of expectations in the context, mixing theoretical 
insights and field evidence to elucidate how career moves along relational lines moderate the conflict-
inducing demands derived from enduring inter-organizational relationships of rivalry and alliance. 
Context 
The Palio di Siena takes place twice a year (July 2nd and August 16th), featuring ten horses and riders, 
representing ten of the seventeen neighborhoods (“contrade”) in Siena2. The race circles three times 
the tuff-covered Piazza del Campo, lasting for about ninety seconds. The Palio can be traced back to 
the early 13th century, even if it is generally acknowledged that the first modern Palio took place in 
1656. A second Palio in the year was added in 1701, while in 1729, the city’s governor, Violante of 
Bavaria, issued a decree restricting to ten the number of participating contrade and defining formal 
boundaries for all contrade. For each Palio, the seven contrade that did not take part in that month of 
                                                        
2 The contrade are: Aquila (Eagle) Bruco (Caterpillar) Chiocciola (Snail) Civetta (Owl) Drago (Dragon) Giraffa 
(Giraffe) Istrice (Porcupine) Leocorno (Unicorn) Lupa (She-Wolf) Nicchio (Seashell) Oca (Goose) Onda (Wave) 
Pantera (Panther) Selva (Forest) Tartuca (Tortoise) Torre (Tower) and Valdimontone (Ram). 
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the previous year are automatically included and three more are chosen by lot. This Palio format has 
remained unchanged eversince, which is why we had the 1730s as a starting point for data collection. 
  The first major event in the Palio is the tratta, the choosing of the horses. Horses are offered 
by private owners and are selected by the neighborhood captains after trial races. Upon selecting ten 
horses, a publicly-held lottery assigns them to contrade. After the lottery, the captains select the jockey 
competing for their neighborhood through negotiation. The jockey has only a few days to practice 
with the horse, during six trial races. The race is preceded by a pageant, the Corteo Storico, featuring 
flag wavers in medieval costumes. Nine horses are lined up at the start line in an order decided by lot, 
while the tenth horse (rincorsa) waits outside. The race begins when the rincorsa starts his run and the 
front rope holding the horses is dropped. The first horse to cross the finish line is declared the winner 
(even if it does so without its jockey) and the contrada is awarded a banner of painted silk (the Palio). 
The contrade were originally designated in the Middle Ages to supply troops to the military 
companies hired to defend Siena from nearby city-states. The contrada is a basic unit of Siena’s social 
structure – a tight-knit local community with established territorial boundaries, a seat of government, 
its own church, museum, hymn, motto, patron saint; it owns property, collects membership dues and 
organizes diverse social activities. A Senese does not join a contrada but is born into it. The contrada 
is the center of social life for its members. As a combination of a mutual aid society and a social club 
(Dundes and Falassi 1975) it cuts across economic and social barriers – the shoemaker socializes with 
the factory owner. Each contrada has a distinct identity that it imparts to its members, conveyed 
through its symbol animal, colors and songs. A sense of belonging is cultivated in a contrada member 
through various socialization practices since the day of birth. 
The Palio constitutes the public arena in which the identity of each contrada is affirmed. There 
is wide agreement among residents and researchers that the Palio is too serious, multi-dimensional and 
identity-creating to be compared to sports (Drechsler 2006: 118). It is an ever-present topic for the 
Senese and the focal point of contrada activity, especially as the summer approaches. It resembles a 
Carnival – the period when disruption and competition are admitted to a greater degree than during the 
rest of the year (Warner 2004: 154). 
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The system of alliances and rivalries is vital to understanding the principles governing the 
contest on the race track. Unlike in sports, alliances and rivalries in the Palio are formally declared, 
requiring a vote by the members of each contrada to be both initiated and terminated. Their origin lies 
in the political agreements between city-states in medieval Italy (Silverman 1979)3. Rivalries are long-
standing and intense, involving mostly adjacent contrade. They are fundamental to the identity of each 
contrada. The retired Jockey#3 told us that: “I still remember the first time I was employed by Aquila, 
they took me to Pantera and told me – this is our rival, this is the first thing you should know”.4 
Alliances are pacts between neighborhoods, featuring obligations, such as regular visits and display of 
the flag of the ally during festivities. An alliance implies preferential treatment in Palio-related 
agreements between contrade. Another informant, Lieutenant#1, explains: “alliances are typically 
enduring relationships, long lasting and sealed in the 18th or 19th century. Because they are old, they 
are typically deeply felt by the people”. 
The Palio is a competition carried out through tactics of negotiation. The failure of one’s rival 
is celebrated almost as joyfully as one’s own victory, while contrade not participating in the race or 
those assigned a weaker horse, do their utmost to thwart the participating rival. Each contrada devises 
a strategy for facilitation and obstruction executed through complex dyadic arrangements (partiti). 
Deals include, for example, pulling or pushing other jockeys, whipping another horse or impeding the 
start of a rival. Formal regulations exist, but in reality, few things are forbidden. Jockeys use a range 
of means to disrupt the movement of other horses or to obstruct other jockeys. In conditions where 
rival contrade hinder each other by any means, conflictual episodes on and off the race track are 
inevitable. These incidents may not have the same intensity as those of medieval family feuds, but on 
occasions they approach that level, with outbreaks of violence between members of rival contrade 
                                                        
3 Many rivalries date back centuries – for example, archival evidence attests that the rivalry between Torre and 
Oca dates back to July 26th, 1671; while the antagonism between Chiocciola and Tartuca can be traced to a 
dispute that occurred on July 27th 1686 (Dundes and Falassi 1975: 51). 
4 We masked the names of all our interviewees (e.g. Jockey #1). This is necessary because of the sensitive nature 
of some of their comments. Considering that many of the interviewees are still active in their roles, we preferred 
not to take the risk of potentially damaging relationships with employers. We compiled a list with the names of 
all our interviewees and submitted it to the editor in charge.      
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(Dundes and Falassi 1975: 50). In the words of Silverman (1979: 419) the Palio is a “form of regulated 
conflict that is structured like a game”– a social system where the threat of conflict is ever present. 
Jockeys’ careers in Siena 
Whether this threat is realized depends critically on the jockey – his cooperation in implementing the 
strategy of the contrade is essential. It is a peculiar aspect of the Palio that the success of pre-race 
arrangements hinges on the loyalty of an outsider. Jockeys are mercenaries, hired to represent a 
contrada for a specific Palio. However, they are also expected to behave as if they were members of 
the contrada for the duration of this Palio only. 
This contradiction represents a fundamental source of uncertainty: when a contrada hires a 
jockey, it can never be certain of his commitment, as he may offer his services to the highest bidder or 
collude with other jockeys to rig the race.5 This uncertainty is inherent in “principal-agent” 
configurations, where the inability of principals to monitor agents creates incentives for them to 
further their own interests or disobey orders (Erikson and Bearman 2006). The main problem in the 
“principal-agent” literature concerns the incentives and monitoring systems needed to ensure 
alignment between the “public” and “private” interests of agents (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Carlos 
and Nicholas 1993). We are interested in a related, but distinct problem – how the misalignment 
between these interests regulates conflict in the race. 
The commitment of jockeys is expressed in two principal ways – in trying hard to win and in 
fulfilling their employer’s demands. In the words of Jockey#2: “Every jockey, when he wears a 
contrada’s uniform, acts in the interest of the contrada, which gives him orders to follow and 
guarantees. The jockey follows the orders.” Another former jockey, Jockey#5, told us that “you cannot 
be a jockey in Siena if you do not know how to handle relationships with contrade and you are not 
ready to do whatever [the contrade] ask you to do”. 
As contrade try to optimize the fit between jockey and horse, jockeys regularly move between 
contrade. Therefore, careers constitute a sequence of short, but emotionally intense relationships 
between contrade and jockeys, where past and future employment co-exist in temporal proximity. In 
                                                        
5 Not surprisingly, the Sienese refer to the Palio line-up as ‘I dieci assassini’ or “the ten killers”. 
12 
the words of Jockey#6: “Everybody believes in you, from the child to the 90-years old. They are good 
at instilling in you a strong motivation, without too much pressure. When you wear that uniform, you 
are one of them.” As Dundes and Falassi (1975: 72) observe: “...in past years [the jockey] may have 
represented other contrade and in future years he may likewise represent other contrade. But for this 
[Palio] all of the hopes of the contrada rest with him.” 
The same source documents the weight of expectations on jockeys, and the discontent 
provoked by the perceived lack of effort or suspected non-compliance with orders. In their fleeting 
nature and short duration, employment spells are reminiscent of weak ties, but on the core dimension 
of emotional intensity (Granovetter 1973) they are “stronger” than weak ties. As confirmed by our 
fieldwork, employment relationships often become overlaid with social content that endures even after 
the end of the relationship. Jockey#2 told us that during his career he has “developed personal 
friendships [with his employers] that are very important still nowadays”. Another Jockey (#9) states in 
an exchange with a journalist: “I follow the race even when I am not part of it, and I go and chat with 
contrada members of Oca and Lupa. I have strong ties with these contrade.” As these statements 
illustrate, within circuits of professional mobility some contrade matter more than others to a jockey. 
As Jockey#1 explained to us, a jockey tends to have “tighter relationships with 3-4-5 contrade that 
are the reference point”. The emotional “load” of these ties and memories of positive experiences with 
a contrada may influence his actions toward that contrada when the jockey is representing other 
contrade. In our interviews, employers referred to these situations pejoratively as jockeys’ “wearing 
another uniform underneath” – a metaphor for the process of overlaying that we defined as “temporal 
multiplexity”. 
 This overlaying tends to be perceived as negative by captains as it may interfere with the 
execution of their strategic plans. Lieutenant#1 articulated this concern well: “Typically the interests 
of the jockey and of the contrada are well aligned, so there is no problem to deal with. However, when 
the relationships of the jockey and the relationships of the contrada are not aligned, things become 
more complex [to manage]”. These circumstances pose challenges for captains but may be 
advantageous to jockeys. For example, in celebrating his win in the race, Jockey#6 thanked “…those 
who have been close to me in the past, even amongst the contrade that unfortunately did not run this 
13 
year, but that stay close to me – I thank them too, because [my win] is also thanks to them.” As this 
statement implies, past affiliations endure well after their termination. Employers are apprehensive of 
the “shadow of the past”, cast by past relationships and experiences of jockeys. The next section 
establishes the theoretical significance of this overlaying process, linking it to the rate of occurrence of 
Palio incidents. Our key insight is that the uncertainty resulting from career mobility may have a 
collective benefit that is ignored by the employers – the moderation of conflict. 
Hypotheses 
Relationally-loaded ties and conflict escalation 
In conceptualizing relational factors of conflict regulation, scholars differentiate between two types of 
ties – relationally-loaded and neutral6. The former are enduring ties characterized by their “embedded” 
nature and emotional intensity (Granovetter 1985, Uzzi 1997). They are typically symmetrical, based 
on friendship or antagonism (Simmel 1955). Observations across contexts attest to the link between 
relational symmetry and the likelihood of conflict, which tends to occur between people connected to 
one another (Coser 1956). Thus, Gould (2003: 86) documents a strong association between symmetry 
in a dyad and the likelihood of a dispute. 
  This association is easily identifiable in the case of relationships of rivalry. Rivalry is marked 
by intense competition for resources (Kilduff, Elfenbein and Staw 2010). One of the captains we 
interviewed attributed the occurrence of incidents in the July 2015 Palio to the presence of seven 
contrade with at least one rival on the race track. According to him, such high density of mutual 
antagonism creates an environment that is propitious to incidents. He also remarked that escalation 
was likely to spill over into the following Palio – “We will have nine rivals [on the race track] and 
each will devise imaginative ways to block or harm one’s rival [in August]. This is how the Palio 
works and how it should be”. An informant interviewed in August 2017 confirmed that a contrada can 
be targeted by a rival even when the rival is not participating in the race: “Tomorrow, Nicchio is doing 
something [to prevent Valdimontone from winning]: they will go to another contrada and offer an 
                                                        
6 This distinction maps onto the classic dichotomy between “embedded” and “arm’s length” ties (Granovetter 
1985). Neutral ties designate a connection between parties that is devoid of strong relational content. This can be 
a market exchange, an acquaintance or, as in our case, it may refer to the link created between two (non-rival and 
non-allied) contrade when a jockey moves from one to the other.    
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amount to make their horse collide with that of Valdimontone”. Jockeys that we interviewed 
confirmed that rivalries are conducive to violence. For example, Jockey#5 told us that “Rivalries 
influence what contrade ask you to do. Because when you go on the race track, and the rival is there, 
you are asked to do different things, not only to win”. The propensity of rivalry to lead to incidents 
may handicap jockey performance – two star jockeys we interviewed recognized that they try to steer 
clear of rivalries in their choice of employer, to increase their chances of winning the race. 
The role played by cooperative ties in conflict is more contested in the literature (e.g., Collins 
2012, Gould 2003). In disputes actors tend to call on their allies as a way of demonstrating that they 
are not alone. Reliance on allies may succeed in forestalling escalation when interpreted as a clear 
demonstration of intent, conveying the message that violence will be collective (Gould 1999, 2000). In 
this perspective, alliances can prevent the escalation of conflict when serving as a credible signal to 
adversaries of broader involvement. But the mobilization of allies can also have the inverse effect7, 
when the demonstration of group solidarity is not deemed credible or when it encourages the other 
side to retaliate by mobilizing its own allies (Gould 2003). As sociological research attests, conflict 
propagates through chains of social relations, when actors mobilize their alliances, forcing neutrals to 
pick sides and escalating tension (Collins 2012). 
We expect that the second scenario is more likely to occur in our context, as adversaries are 
familiar with each other and as information asymmetries conducive to intimidation are attenuated in a 
race that is regularly contested. Our fieldwork suggests likewise: only one informant recalled a case 
where the activation of an alliance of four contrade prevented a brawl to escalate by withdrawing three 
horses and jockeys from the race in response to threats by a rival to the administrator of the race. 
Consistent with past studies (Gould 1999, 2000, Collins 2012), we argue that the risk of involvement 
in an incident augments with the number of one’s allies, as it makes it more likely that a contrada 
would have to intervene on behalf of one of them in display of solidarity. As Bearman (2003) points 
                                                        
7 The complex, non-linear dynamic of escalation of conflict articulated in Gould (1999, 2000, 2003) can be 
summarized with an example. A street-wise kid knows not to pick on those with extended families, including 
brothers or cousins, as this increases the probability of running into trouble with another member of the family. 
However, it also means that for any family member the probability of running into trouble is overall greater, 
because of the necessity to intervene on behalf of other members. Hence, alliances can both prevent incidents, 
when intimidating others into backing off in disputes, but also encourage them when these become collective. 
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out, it is the “stickiness” of these relationships that predisposes to conflict – the fact that one is locked 
into a fixed position or role (friend or rival) with an associated set of expectations. That these 
expectations are constraining in nature and weigh heavily on Palio preparation is attested to by the 
captain of Tartuca in 1947: “The weight of the alliance with Oca is a burden! I wish I could focus all 
my energy on the rival, Chiocciola, but I have to take into account all the moves of all the contrade 
belonging to the opposite camp!” (Luchini, 2010: 43). Conflict escalates when actors conform to 
expectations of group solidarity or when their non-conformity is perceived as betrayal of norms of 
friendship (Coser 1956, Gould 2003). As Coser (1956) contends, antagonism is a central part of 
intimate social relations (i.e. of rivalry and friendship) and a by-product of cooperation and frequent 
interaction.8 Hence, we expect that relationally-loaded ties (between friends or rivals) raise the stakes 
and emotional intensity in the race, making more likely the occurrence of incidents.  
Hypothesis 1: The probability that a contrada is involved in a conflictual episode increases with the 
number of relationally loaded ties (alliances, rivalries) maintained by that contrada 
Mobility ties and conflict moderation 
If relationally-loaded ties facilitate escalation, we expect career mobility along the same lines to have 
a moderating effect. Mobility poses the issue of commitment for jockeys in a matrix of relatively 
recent past affiliations. It leads to the overlaying of affiliations that co-exist within jockeys. We argue 
that this co-existence reduces the willingness to endorse conflict-inducing demands. Two mechanisms 
are expected to feature here – the transfer of relational content and the attenuation of social control. 
 Career mobility serves as a conduit of relational-emotional content, carried over upon the 
termination of employment. Actors carry the baggage of past ties into the new workplace (Godart et 
al. 2014), filing away emotional attachments for extended periods of time (Granovetter 2017). Our 
fieldwork provides ample evidence for relational endurance. For Jockey#1: “even when you provide a 
service [to a contrada] for a single race, you create ties that last well beyond the single race”. For 
Jockey#7: “the ties you create with a contrada, they last forever, so even if the people in charge of the 
                                                        
8 For Coser (1956) in relationships in which individuals are deeply involved, both feelings of attraction and 
hostility are likely to arise. The closer the relationship, the greater the affective investment and the potential for 
emotional ambivalence. In agreement with Gould (2003), conflict in these conditions tends to be more intense. 
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contrada change, you keep the tie with the contrada for your entire career”. Similarly, Jockey#6 
recognizes that “with the contrade where I did well, I have ties that last forever”. 
 One consequence of the overlaying of past on present employment ties is that past emotional  
attachments may interfere with the fulfillment of tasks required by current employment. Sociologists 
observe that emotional attachments may override the self-interest of parties (Uzzi 1997). As Sgourev 
and Zuckerman (2011) show, the addition of social elements to self-interested relations increases the 
asymmetry between assuming a role and fulfilling the expectations linked to it. Career mobility can 
lead to psychological discomfort and to difficulties reconciling past with present affiliations (e.g., 
Conroy and O’Leary-Kelly 2014). These difficulties are likely to reduce commitment to one’s 
employer, particularly when the current affiliation is perceived as inconsistent with a past one. 
Transitional states between work roles are most conducive to psychological discomfort and 
uncertainty in highly-charged social environments and complex relational space (Ibarra et al. 2003). 
At some point in their careers, jockeys are likely to race for a rival of a contrada for which they had 
raced before, or an ally of its rival. In such cases, compliance with demands by the new employer may 
be perceived as incompatible with previous affiliations, resulting in feelings of uneasiness. This is well 
articulated by Jockey#11: “Given that I regularly worked for Bruco, it is quite normal [that when I 
raced twice for Oca] I felt ill at ease with it. Bruco has intimately considered Oca as a rival, even if it 
is not formalized”. A structural position between rivals is intrinsically contradictory, necessitating 
maneuvering to avoid clarification of commitment (Padgett and Ansell 1993). The existence of 
contradiction contributes to making the actor less reliable in achieving goals that target proximate 
others or less prone to fulfilling role expectations unquestionably, in the manner required for the 
escalation of conflict (Collins 2012). 
The second mechanism concerns the attenuation of social control over the jockey. By moving 
between contrade, jockeys create trajectories that connect past and present employers. As Kilduff et al. 
(2006: 1040) propose, to the extent that actors retain ties to former employers, the strengthening of 
past ties will restrict the extent to which the current affiliation can shape cognition and behavior. The 
argument that mobility imparts autonomy to individuals echoes key tenets of the sociology of Simmel 
(1955). By linking multiple networks or remote social locations, individuals differentiate themselves 
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from others, creating trajectories that afford greater leeway for the construction of identities (Simmel 
1955, 1971).9 This development generally reduces the extent to which others (i.e. the employers) can 
exercise control over the individual (Simmel 1955). As DeputyPrior#1 observes: “The assumption in 
Siena is that jockeys are not reliable. You cannot always control them. In Siena, jockeys and hookers 
did not have the right to vote. The same lot”. From this angle, what brings jockeys and the other 
category together is their accelerated mobility between employers, which contradicts the 
characteristically long-term nature of relationships in Siena. The issue of control is primordial – both 
in granting voting rights and ensuring the loyalty of jockeys. 
 Our interviews confirmed the inherent tension between the desire of employers to obtain the 
compliance of jockeys in executing orders and the desire of jockeys to maintain freedom of choice as 
to their performance and career mobility. Jockey#6 shared with us that: “[as jockeys] we want to 
maintain our own freedom, to have more degrees of freedom on the race track or move to the best 
horse”. Jockey#5 identified the source of tension as: “you must be ready to do what [the contrade] 
ask, but also be mindful of what is good for you”. This tension is heightened in cases of mobility 
across rivals or allies, as the relational “load” of these ties tends to constrain agency. 
If moves between allies are facilitated by cooperative relationships, our fieldwork suggests 
that they are not always harmonious, privileging organizational over career considerations. It is not 
unusual for a contrada to lend a capable jockey to an ally when allotted a horse with a slim chance to 
win. Jockey#1 told us that “I would gladly go where the contrade I have ties to suggest”. But others 
attest that pacts between allies may undermine the performance of jockeys by restricting their leeway 
to join a contrada with a better horse, generating resentment and reducing the willingness to execute 
unquestionably orders. According to Jockey#3: “if I, contrada x, have an alliance with contrada y, 
then I prefer to send you to y, even if you would prefer that other contrada, you must go there, and 
then you may be rightly upset and still you do your best, but you may be less successful at doing it… 
                                                        
9 “The narrower the circle to which we commit ourselves, the less freedom of individuality we possess… if the 
circle in which we are active and in which our interests hold sway enlarges, there is more room in it for the 
development of our individuality” (Simmel 1971, p. 255). 
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because we are human, if you send me somewhere else, then I do what I can, but I am not happy about 
it”. 
 The misalignment between role expectations and their fulfillment is more transparent in the  
case of mobility between rivals. Jockeys attest to their reluctance to execute orders that they deem as 
incompatible with their relational history. Jockey#1 articulated this well: “I do what they ask me, but I 
cannot do what they ask me if I have ties with the other side, we are human”. Jockey#7 made a similar 
observation: “it is normal that, if you are running for a contrada, and there is another contrada on the 
race track that you have a tie with, such as you ran a Palio with them in the past and it worked out 
well, you left a good memory, they left you a good memory, then you keep them in your heart and 
would not act against them if you were both happy”. 
Navigating complex patterns of mobility, such as those between rivals or allies, is typically 
accompanied by tension and conflict that are likely to decrease the readiness to comply with orders 
contradicting key relational aspects of personal identities. Our fieldwork suggests that jockeys have an 
intuitive understanding of the constraining power of “temporal multiplexity” – the overlaying of 
personal on organizational relationships. Thus, Jockey#2 observed that: “when you overlay too much 
the personal relationships and the professional side, you run the risk of being constrained in your 
professional conduct on the race track or in your [career] moves”. This constraint may contribute to 
disrupting the strategies of contrade on the race track or the careers plans of jockeys, but has positive 
externalities when serving to prevent violence. If relationally-loaded ties predispose to the occurrence 
of incidents by locking actors into fixed roles with associated demands, we expect that career mobility 
along the same lines facilitates moderation through the transfer of relational content and attenuation of 
social control over jockeys. In this perspective, mobility matters by building bridges between rivals 
and by fostering misalignment between allies. Such transitional states are conducive to doubt and are 
expected to reduce the willingness to execute unquestionably conflict-inducing orders. 
Hypothesis 2: The probability that a contrada is involved in a conflictual episode decreases with the 
amount of experience of its jockey with allies/rivals of the contrada. 
 
Data and Variables 
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We draw historical data on the Palio from the transcription of documents from the archives of the 
municipality of Siena and of individual neighborhoods by Orlando Papei (2012) and Sergio Profeti 
(2012) as well as from books recording the history of races over the last three centuries (Filiani and 
Zaffaroni 2002, 2003, Lombardi 2002, Giannelli and Picciafuochi 2006). We conducted fieldwork in 
Siena in the summers of 2013 and 2016 and in May 2018, attending the Palios in August 2013, 2016 
and 2017 and those in July 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018. We conducted thirty-two interviews with key 
informants, including active and retired jockeys, captains, priori, lieutenants and journalists that cover 
the race. We also accessed and processed seventy-five interviews with jockeys and contrada captains, 
provided to us by a local journalist. Field data provided additional insights on the theorized 
mechanisms and complemented the findings from the quantitative analyses. 
Drawing on detailed published records, we compiled a list of conflictual episodes (incidents) 
formally acknowledged and reported by at least one historical source covering the Palio10. An incident 
is an instance of conflict where one contrada – its jockey or members, engages in an altercation with 
one or more other contrade, jockey or members before, during or after the race. Incidents may be 
initiated by one or more parties. They all entail the occurrence of violence and provoke significant 
losses (injuries, penalties, exclusion from the race or even casualties) for the neighborhoods involved. 
A formal rivalry is not a necessary condition for an incident. Several incidents in our dataset have 
occurred between neutral neighborhoods. Table 1 provides examples of representative incidents 
included in our analyses. 
------Insert Table 1 here ------ 
Consistent with Gould (1999) our dependent variable is the likelihood that contrada i is involved in at 
least one incident related to Palio j at time t. In recognition of the central role of the Palio in the 
organization and social life of Siena (e.g., Biliorsi and Brogi 2011), we chose the Palio as our temporal 
                                                        
10 Incidents occur on and off the race track. We combined the two types of incidents because our fieldwork and 
historical research (Biliorsi and Brogi 2011) suggest a tight link between them – off-track incidents typically 
occur in response to what happened on the track. When the race is uneventful in terms of incidents, contrade 
members have little reason for contestation or discontent, and are less likely to engage in or provoke skirmishes 
with members of other contrade. 
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unit, rather than the calendar year11. We decided against the estimation of a dyadic-level model (the 
probability of an incident occurring between any two contrade) for both substantive and empirical 
reasons. First, as Gould (1999) demonstrates, conflict and violence cannot be reduced to a paired 
relation. This is corroborated by examples of conflictual episodes that are not dyadic (Table 1). 
Accordingly, our conceptual focus is on the conditions making a contrada more likely to be involved 
in an incident, rather than which particular contrada it would be involved with. Second, incidents are 
rare events. Estimating the models at the contrada-Palio level, rather than at the dyad level, yields 
greater statistical power. We return to the operationalization of the dependent variable in the 
Robustness section, where we conduct additional analyses based on the types of incidents. 
To test the hypothesized effects of inter-organizational ties, we collected information on the 
duration of all formally declared alliances and rivalries between 1743 and 2010. We capture 
relationally loaded inter-organizational relationships by counting the Number of Allies and the Number 
of Rivals of each contrada for each year. For the analysis of mobility, we reconstructed the careers of 
480 jockeys over the period 1743-2010, recording the number of previous affiliations with allies 
(Experience with Allies) and rivals (Experience with Rivals) of the current employer. Measures based 
on repeated interactions reflect the strength of the relationship between a jockey and the ally (rival) of 
his current employer (e.g., Uzzi 1997). 
During the period 1743 to1762, information on jockeys is missing for several contrada-Palio 
pairs. We use this period to compute pre-sample independent variables, beginning our estimation in 
1762. We include several contrada-level factors that may affect the propensity of (the members of) a 
contrada to engage in conflictual episodes. We control for the number of Palios that a contrada 
participated in (Contrada Experience), as the probability of involvement in an incident increases with 
Palio participation (as opposed to remaining behind the scenes). We also control for the proportion of 
races won by each contrada (Contrada Previous Win), as a contrada that has not won a race for a long 
time experiences stronger performance pressure and may be prone to engaging in conflictual episodes. 
                                                        
11 In unreported analyses, we also aggregated the data at the contrada-year level and repeated our analyses using 
a Poisson specification. Results remained unchanged. 
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We also control for relevant jockey-level factors. For instance, jockeys’ experience is likely to 
affect their inherent propensity to engage in conflictual episodes. Inexperienced jockeys are prone to 
take risks in the race to enhance their reputation and to attract the attention of the captains of the 
wealthiest neighborhoods. We control for the number of races run by a jockey (Jockey Experience). 
Some jockeys (“Fantino di Contrada”), establish long-term contractual relationship with a contrada. 
These contracts are designed to align the interests of the principal (the contrada) and the agent (the 
jockey). The contract restricts the potential career moves of the jockey, who agrees to race only for his 
employer (or his allies) in exchange for a yearly payment. These contracts are rare and generally not 
formally reported. As an alternative measure of jockey’s loyalty, we also compute the Herfindhal 
index of his previous affiliations (Affiliation Diversity). We control for the proportion of races won by 
each jockey (Jockey Previous Win) - jockeys with a strong winning record may be more risk-averse, 
being more concerned about future mobility and less committed to a particular  
contrada. 
 Until the beginning of the 20th century father and son or brothers could run for different 
contrade12. We count the number of family members in the race (Family ties), expecting that cross-
cutting family ties reduce the likelihood of incident occurrence. We also take into consideration 
potential spillover effects – conflict initiated during one race may breed more hostility in a subsequent 
race. To that end we include two dummy variables for the July and August Palios. Extraordinary races 
represent the omitted category. Contrade often choose jockeys based on their potential fit with the 
horse type assigned to them. Thus, horse-related characteristics may shape the mobility options of a 
jockey. We use nine horse-type fixed effects to account for horse features.13 We also use seventeen 
neighborhood fixed effects to control for enduring differences in resource endowments between 
contrade. To capture time effects, we introduce five-time windows (Pre1796; 1796-1848; 1849-1906; 
                                                        
12 The participation of jockeys belonging to the same family has been prohibited between 1907 and 1973. It was 
allowed before 1907 and after 1973. 
13 In the archives, horses were typically classified based on horsehair color. Based on expert evaluation we 
assigned each horse to one of the following categories: Baio, Baio oscuro, Grigio/moscato/pomellato, Falbo/ 
Isabella, Roano, Sauro and Storno. Mixed/undefined is the omitted category. 
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1907-1948; Post1949). These periods, identified from historical research, capture major changes in the 
Palio regulations14, which may affect the overall propensity to engage in conflictual episodes. 
Empirical strategy 
As our dependent variable is binary in nature, we estimate a logit model predicting the likelihood that 
contrada i is involved in an incident during Palio j. We chose a logit model as the main specification 
because it allows us to better control for unobserved heterogeneity through contrada and horse fixed 
effects. To account for the non-independence of observations and for autocorrelation in the data, we 
clustered standard errors by jockey (Petersen, 2009). 
Our data feature a relatively small number of contrade involved in incidents during each Palio. 
King and Zeng (2000) suggest that standard logit estimation underestimates the probability of an event 
occurring when the events are rare. For this reason, we complement our main models by estimating a 
rare event logit model. In the Robustness section, we discuss alternative estimation approaches. 
 
Results 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in the analysis. Incidents are a rare occurrence 
with large variation – we recorded 109 incidents in 539 races, on average 0.04 incidents per contrada 
Palio. Alliances are far more widespread than rivalries – there are 3.2 allies and 0.5 rivals per contrada 
on average. Unsurprisingly, networks constrain the mobility of jockeys – it is seven times more 
common for jockeys to have experience with an ally of their employer than a rival. Jockeys run on 
average in 12.5 Palios in their career, winning about 10% of them. All correlations are within 
acceptable boundaries, except for that between Jockey Experience and Experience with Allies (0.71). 
Multicollinearity is not an issue, as the mean Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the full model is 3.9, 
below the recommended thresholds in the literature (e.g., Neter, Wasserman and Kutner 1989). 
------Insert Table 2-3 here ------ 
The results from the logit models are presented in Table 3. The baseline Model 1 confirms that 
the incident rate increases with the number of races ran by a contrada. The results suggest that success 
                                                        
14 For instance, after 1949 jockeys are searched by police officers before the Mossa. This prevents them from 
carrying objects that can hurt competitors during the race. The norm was enforced from 1952 onwards. 
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on the track is conducive to involvement in incidents. This may be because more successful jockeys 
and contrade are targeted by others but can also be because they assert themselves more forcefully in 
aspiring for victory. Winning jockeys are also more likely to be involved in incidents. Compared to 
the baseline period (pre-1796) the probability of incident occurrence increases over time, but the effect 
is not statistically significant by conventional standards (p<0.05). 
Model 2 introduces the counts of allies and rivals of the focal contrada, while model 3 adds 
the measures for experience with allies and rivals. The positive coefficient of the Number of Rivals 
variable confirms the expected positive effect of negative ties on the likelihood of incidents. Strong, 
positive effects are also registered for the Number of Allies. The odds of an incident increase by a 
factor of 2.75 for each additional rival and by a factor of 1.26 for each additional ally. The results 
confirm that there is a downside to the mobilization of allies in conflictual situations, as the 
reinforcement of group solidarity by activating strong ties provokes one’s rivals into mobilizing 
support on their end, thereby escalating, rather than mitigating, conflict (Collins 2012, Gould 2000). 
We posited career mobility as a countervailing force to the escalating mechanism underlying 
the activation of collaborative and conflictual relationships. Model 3 provides evidence that confirms 
the role of mobility in regulating social conflict: the moves of jockeys across neighborhoods over time 
are associated with a lower incident rate. Prior experience of jockeys with an ally or a rival of their 
employer tempers the structural effects – jockeys appear less willing to engage in hostilities in view of 
their past affiliations. Based on the estimates presented in Table 3, the odds of an incident decrease by 
a factor of 0.91 for a one-unit change in the Experience with Allies and by a factor of 0.84 for a one 
unit change in the Experience with Rivals. These effects are confirmed in the estimation of a rare event 
logit model (King and Zeng, 2000). The coefficients have the same signs and are significant at the 
same levels (Model 4). Results are robust when using a standard logit model, including contrada and 
horse-type fixed effects (see Model 5). 
Robustness analyses 
Alternative explanations. To rule out alternative explanations, we estimated analyses with additional 
controls (Table 4). Particularly important is Model 6, where we add experience with neutral contrade 
and with the employing contrada to the variables capturing experience with allies and rivals. Results 
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confirm that the incident rate is not attenuated by career mobility in general, but by career moves 
across embedded relationships – between allies and between rivals. Past experience with neutral 
contrade does not affect significantly the incident rate, and neither does experience with the current 
contrada – probably because long-serving jockeys are more likely to execute orders against others, 
acting with less self-restraint than jockeys changing employment. Our fieldwork lends support to these 
observations. Jockeys moving in the “grey areas” (between contrade that are neither allies, nor rivals) 
reported having greater degree of freedom on the race track. 
------Insert Table 4 here ------ 
A possibility raised in our fieldwork is that career moves are determined by the jockey-horse 
match. However, our results remain robust when controlling for jockey familiarity with a specific type 
of horse (Model 7). Our informants also suggested the captains of the contrade significantly influence 
jockeys’ career moves. A captain is a contrada member elected to govern the contrada for a fixed term 
– he negotiates with jockeys and develops relationships with them. Model 8 adds a set of captain-level 
controls: his tenure (Captain Experience), the nature of his role (Long Term vs. Temporary) and a 
dummy for his rookie year (Captain Change). Notably, the incident rate is not affected by the 
experience level of the captain but increases significantly when a contrada is headed by a newly-
elected captain. This may be because new captains are less effective at managing exchanges with 
jockeys and other contrade to their benefit or because of their desire to assert themselves early in their 
tenure. That the results remain unchanged upon the introduction of these variables implies that the key 
findings cannot be reduced to the strategizing of captains. 
We also control for environmental factors in conflict regulation. Model 9 introduces basic 
macroeconomic and institutional variables. For the period after 1880 we collected Italian GDP and 
population data (Malanima 2011, Jutta and Van Zenden 2013), and the number of court cases for 
public misdemeanor (ISTAT)15. Results suggest that the incident rate increases during economic 
downturns (p<0.10). We checked for institutional influence but found no evidence for a significant 
                                                        
15 We refer to the total number of suits filed under the rubric “Liti e percosse” (ISTAT) 
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association between the number of public misdemeanor cases brought to court and the probability of 
incident occurrence. Against these controls, the results of the analysis remain robust. 
Additional analyses. In unreported analyses we implemented several additional robustness 
checks. To increase confidence in our causal inferences, we specified a different lag structure of the 
variables, but the results remained intact. We recomputed the Number of Allies and Number of Rivals 
using only active alliances and rivalries (participating in the race). We also used time windows of five 
and ten races to compute the mobility variables. Results are aligned with those reported so far. To 
account for unobserved differences in the propensity of each contrada to provoke incidents, we also 
included the count of incidents that a contrada was involved in prior to the current Palio. Estimates 
were in line with those presented. We also ran the analyses excluding the jockeys with the longest 
careers, to make sure our results are not driven by outliers. Results remain robust. 
Incidents’ coding. We recognize that our dependent variable may be susceptible to two types 
of biases. First, incidents are defined based on the interpretation of historical sources. Given the 
possibility of coding bias, the second author revisited the sources and re-compiled a list of incidents. 
The inter-rater agreement was 98% on commonly rated items, with Cohen’s kappa at 0.735. Results 
were unchanged when using only incidents recognized by both coders. Second, the dependent variable 
combines on- and off- race track episodes. We did so for substantive and empirical reasons. As 
implied in historical work (e.g., Biliorsi and Brogi 2011) and by our fieldwork, off-track incidents are 
typically connected in some way to the race itself (see Table 1 for a few examples). For example, 
interviewees recounted stories of contrade skirmishes occurring days or weeks after the Palio, upon 
evidence surfacing of jockey’s treason, of unfulfilled pledges or another form of perceived treachery. 
Incidents may also occur in the weeks preceding the Palio, in reaction to rumors about treachery. In 
recognition of the complex nature of incidents and the practical difficulty of disentangling types of 
incidents that are often, if not always, related, we decided to combine the two. That this approach is 
not a source of bias in the estimates is confirmed by the results of a simultaneous bivariate probit 
regression, where we differentiated between incidents that could be directly linked to events during the 
race or the behavior of the jockey (i.e. explicitly mentioned in the historical sources) and those lacking 
a direct link. The results for the “direct-link” incidents align with those already presented, while the 
26 
residuals of the two equations are highly correlated (a Wald test rejects the hypothesis of rho=0; 
Chi2(1) =14.61, p<0.001). An aggregated variable does justice to the social context and to an 
analytical approach, where incidents have social consequences that cannot be limited in time or space. 
It is also recommended by the low frequency of incidents. 
Endogeneity of embedded moves. Another potential concern is the possibility that unobserved 
traits drive both the incident rate and the propensity of jockeys to engage in embedded career moves 
(i.e. the probability that they move between allies or rivals). To rule out this possibility, we estimated a 
Heckman probit model (Van de Ven and Van Praag 1981). At the first stage, we estimate the 
probability of a move from an ally or a rival. As an instrument, we used a variable, labeled Nonna, 
which takes the value of “1” for the neighborhood with the longest non-winning spell, “0” otherwise. 
The nonna is eager to win and as a result, should be more likely to recruit a talented jockey from a 
rival or ally. The effect on incident occurrence is less obvious – the nonna may be expected to avoid 
incidents, as they reduce the chances of winning, but the determination to win may also provoke more 
aggressive behavior during the race. The results of our analyses corroborate this view and the use of 
nonna as an instrument: contrade with the longest non-winning spells are more likely to hire jockeys 
from allies or rivals, but their incident rate is not significantly different from that of others.16 Using the 
estimates from the first stage (available upon request), we computed the Inverse Mills Ratio and 
included it as an explanatory variable in the second-stage regression. Model 10 in Table 4 presents the 
estimates of the second-stage probit, featuring the Inverse Mills Ratio. While positive, the Inverse 
Mills Ratio is not significant; the results remain robust. The evidence suggests that our results are 
unlikely to be affected by selection bias. 
 
Discussion 
The contribution of this paper is in clarifying the nature of “temporal multiplexity” (Shipilov et al. 
2014) and broadening the concept to apply to different levels of analysis and different time scales. 
                                                        
16 Following a friendly reviewer suggestion, we also tried to use the results of the ballot assigning horses as an 
instrument for hiring decisions. However, it is not possible to uniquely identify horses participating to the race 
between 1743-1930 (just their type). Additional analyses based on the 1930-2010 period reveal that horse quality 
is not correlated with embedded moves. 
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Scholars are regularly encouraged to cross levels of analysis by showing how network ties interact 
with individual cognitions (e.g., Ibarra et al. 2005, Ahuja et al. 2012) or explore processes involving 
ties of different duration (Ahuja et al. 2012, Quintane and Carnabuci 2016). The concept of temporal 
multiplexity is instrumental in achieving these objectives. It allows to examine the co-existence and 
mutual influence of ties at different levels of analysis or of different duration, or how discrepancies in 
duration lead to misalignment between individual and organizational interests. These represent key 
avenues for the application and development of the concept in network and organizational scholarship.  
The analysis attested to the dynamic interplay of individual mobility and inter-organizational 
networks in explaining the escalation of conflict. This was made possible by unique network and 
mobility data from a historical relational event. Previous studies emphasize the role of structural 
factors (Gould 1999, 2000, Collins 2012) and boundary-spanning individuals (Simmel 1955) in 
regulation of conflict. Our approach looks jointly at structure and individuals over time, demonstrating 
how actors interpret and respond to the constraints posed by structure (Kilduff et al. 2006). 
Our principal finding is that the overlaying of individual and organizational ties of different 
duration moderates conflict. The relational content in mobility ties makes the past more vivid for 
jockeys, reinforcing contradictions and alleviating social control in ways that make them less likely to 
execute bellicose demands stemming from alliances or rivalries. By introducing tension in the 
overlaying process through temporal discrepancies, the paper responds to the call to adapt multiplexity 
theory to conditions of uncertainty and risk (Smith and Papachristos 2016). If it is well-recognized that 
career mobility weaves ties between past and present employers (Godart et al. 2014, Phillips 2011), 
little attention is paid to the links mobility creates within actors, overlaying the new affiliation on top 
of the old one (Gould 2003, Kilduff et al. 2006). The theoretical importance of these “transitional 
states” is in creating preconditions for the misalignment between individual action and organizational 
demands. Misalignment is associated with indeterminate identification and tension (Ibarra 2003, 
Conroy and O’Leary-Kelly 2014), but we highlight its positive function in reducing compliance with 
conflict-inducing demands. This supports the argument that the layering of past relations in individual 
memories reduces the degree to which the current affiliation can shape behavior (Kilduff et al. 2006). 
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The evidence is also consistent with a mechanism familiar from Simmel (1955). The temporal 
“stacking” of ties creates complex mobility trajectories that afford greater leeway for individual 
action. Navigating these trajectories facilitates moderation when it contributes to relaxing the social 
control over actors by increasing the asymmetry between assuming a role and fulfilling the 
expectations associated with it. By disassociating roles from behavioral expectations, mobility reduces 
the stakes of competition or the willingness to execute demands that are intended to raise them. 
This function of mobility contravenes the rigidity of “symmetrical” social space. Our results 
confirmed that the “stickiness” of relationships predisposes to conflict, locking actors into fixed roles 
with set expectations. That the activation of rivalries and alliances favors escalation is in line with the 
observation that conflict propagates through relationally-loaded ties, whether positive or negative in 
nature (Gould 1999, 2000, Collins 2012). Our results corroborate the association between relational 
symmetry and conflict that was identified by Gould (2003). Symmetric ties are conflict-ridden and 
emotionally ambivalent (Coser 1956), and are instrumental in turning individual into collective 
disputes. The mobilization of allies promotes polarization, provoking one’s rivals into doing the same. 
This finding is pertinent to research on the “dark side” of social networks. Studies document 
negative effects of social networks on positive outcomes (i.e. when over-embeddedness reduces firm 
performance Uzzi 1997) or identify conditions under which the costs of embeddedness trump the 
benefits (Lee 2013). Our study provides evidence for a positive effect of alliances on the escalation of 
conflict. Social networks are capable of both aggravating and moderating conflict, with the outcome 
contingent on contextual factors (Granovetter 1985, Gould 2003). 
The pattern emerging from our analysis, where organizational ties escalate and mobility ties 
moderate conflict occurrence, is neither explicitly intended, nor fully visible to participants. Social 
regulation of this kind illustrates the “complex chemistry” of the interplay between individual and 
organizational networks (Ibarra et al. 2005, Moliterno and Mahony 2011, McEvily, Soda and 
Tortoriello 2014). The Palio di Siena is an entrenched social structure, where organizational ties 
change little over time and where the mobility of jockeys is the most dynamic component. This 
mobility is a source of uncertainty for captains but is essential in achieving moderation in social space 
that is conducive to outbursts of violence. 
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In our fieldwork, we inquired about the observed dependencies. Interviews with jockeys were 
instrumental in identifying the underlying mechanisms. Captains and contrade members were not 
aware of the uncovered effect of career mobility but found it credible – it is accepted that jockey 
performance is only partly controlled by the employer. It is perhaps ironic that the overlaying of 
affiliations of jockeys, habitually decried by the Senese as a source of corruption in the race, proves a 
positive social regulator. Some captains may have developed an intuitive understanding of this 
dynamic but prefer not to crack down on jockeys in recognition of community-level benefits related to 
conflict moderation. However, note that such moderation can only be effective if surreptitious in 
nature, as it counters the execution of the strategic plans of contrade that tend to escalate conflict. 
 Our fieldwork testified to the necessity to analyze positive and negative social relationships  
together, as they not only influence each other, but jointly shape performance. Lieutenant#1 directed 
our attention to the fact that a key source of tension between the interests of jockeys and contrade is 
social structure itself, as it evolved in a temporally unequal manner. The overlaying of new rivalries in 
the early 20th century over pre-existing enduring alliances led to the emergence of structural 
inconsistencies in the form of unbalanced triads. Some alliances were dissolved, but others survived, 
posing challenges for contrade in negotiating with allies and for jockeys in charting career trajectories 
that conform with structural constraints. These inconsistencies require flexibility in navigating 
relational configurations, but also contribute to decreasing the alignment between identities and roles 
that facilitates conflict escalation. 
Generalizability and Future Research 
Scholarship emphasizes the need of relational, contextual and systemic accounts of social processes 
(Borgatti and Foster 2003). There are relatively few occasions to analyze longitudinally social systems 
where conflict and collaboration co-exist and co-evolve (Sytch and Tatarynowicz 2014: 585). Unique 
longitudinal data allowed us to investigate a system that has maintained the same format for centuries. 
Naturally, the idiosyncratic nature of the context poses the question of the degree to which the findings 
can be generalized. Two considerations alleviate such concerns. First, our results are aligned with 
findings in sociology, based on settings that have little in common with the Palio di Siena (e.g., Gould 
1999, 2000). Second, confidence in the generalizability of results is reinforced by evidence from other 
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contexts. An analysis of mobility in the National Hockey League (Grohsjean et al. 2016) demonstrates 
that hockey players engage in less aggressive behavior against former colleagues, concluding that 
players allow former employers to perform better. The finding that players employed by one team 
“spare” colleagues from a previous team agrees with what is observed in Siena. However, the featured 
mechanism is different – if we recognize the importance of identity processes that these authors 
consider as central, we attribute a role to temporal multiplexity that is relational in nature and is 
irreducible to individual intentions. 
Studies of career mobility are almost exclusively focused on its performance implications 
(Wezel et al. 2006, Somaya et al. 2008), but mobility has a broader social impact. More research is 
needed on the relational nature of employment, in agreement with studies applying a network lens     
to careers (Phillips 2011, Godart et al. 2014). The conditions featured in our setting, where strategy 
implementation depends on key individuals, are not unlike those in industries where success depends 
critically on highly-mobile talent (i.e. designers, creative directors, consultants) and where labor 
markets are structured by short, emotionally-charged spells of employment. A network perspective on 
careers in these settings is likely to offer valuable insights into the complex motivations that underlie 
creativity, commitment and mobility (Shipilov 2012, Godart et al. 2014). 
A notable limitation of our analysis is the inability to directly observe and differentiate the 
underlying mechanisms. These were inferred from the data and supported by fieldwork observations, 
similar to classic embeddedness studies (Uzzi 1996, 1997). However, more precise evidence is 
necessary, which can be obtained through experimental methods and micro-level observations. We 
encountered the same difficulties that others have documented in attempting to bridge individual and 
network levels of analysis (Ibarra et al. 2005, Kilduff et al. 2006). In this regard, the concept of 
temporal multiplexity can prove useful, but it requires additional work. We recommend for future 
research to differentiate between types of overlay in temporal multiplexity (Figure 1). Studies of other 
types of temporal multiplexity or other behavioral outcomes will contribute to clarifying the scope and 
relevance of our findings.17 
                                                        
17 There are possibilities for the application of methods based on the concept of temporal multiplexity in various 
social domains. For example, journalistic accounts suggest that the overlaying of organizational with mobility 
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One assumption underlying our analysis is that interactions between levels of analysis afford 
researchers greater theoretical insights into the system as a whole (Rousseau 1985). The social system 
of the ancient city of Siena offers a unique opportunity to observe a key characteristic of social living 
– the co-existence of peace and feud, conflict and order (Simmel 1955). However, their balance is not 
automatically produced – it is uncertain and fragile. The process where organizational ties escalate and 
mobility ties moderate conflict is only one aspect of a complex, multi-layered social system that has 
evolved in Siena over centuries. Members of rival contrade, the Senese are also neighbors that co-exist 
peacefully for the rest of the year. However, as the Senese readily admit, the rest of the year is no 
more than a prelude to the frantic, exhilarating and perilous days of the Palio.
                                                        
ties was vital in rewiring French political networks and clearing the road for the unexpected victory of a nascent 
political movement in the 2017 French Presidential Elections. Individual career moves are particularly important 
when crossing entrenched social boundaries, such as those between the Left and Right in the political spectrum. 
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Figure 1 Visual representation of “temporal multiplexity” in career mobility 
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Table 1: Example of conflictual episodes coded as incidents 
 Fierce rivalry in a centuries-old Italian horse race has spilled over into 
such serious violence that police were called in. Six people were put under 
house arrest after one jockey had been badly beaten up. The injured 
jockey, Giuseppe Pes, was riding for the Lupa neighbourhood, despite 
having declared to the Istrice captain that he would not switch to the rival 
contrada. The two districts have a long history of rivalry. Pes’s defection 
was too much for his alleged attackers, who are Istrice supporters. Pes, 
one of the Palio’s most successful jockeys, suffered serious injuries, 
including a broken rib. The six suspects are also accused of stealing the 
badge representing the Lupa neighborhood.  
 August 27, 2002 
(Following the 
August 16th Palio) 
  
August 16, 1861 
The colors of Castelvecchio were defended by Mario Bernini, nicknamed 
“Bachicche”. He was first at the start. The jockey running for Chiocciola, 
Edoardo Seccatici, made an attempt to stop Bachicche during the second 
lap, but his attempt was unsuccessful and he was placed under arrest. The 
victory of Bachicche was greeted by boos from the Campo and he was 
immediately surrounded by armed guards to prevent further rioting. 
August 15, 1829. 
The captain of Valdimontone brought a lawsuit against Matteo Brendani, a 
jockey for the Chiocciola, accused of repeated attempts to damage Gobbo 
Saragiolo, the jockey for Valdimontone, during the 4th trial. Riots erupted 
involving members of the contrade. 
July 3rd, 1898. 
The Torre hired a young jockey from a jockeys’ family from Lazio - 
Angelo Meloni “Picino”. The Oca hired a jockey with a Sienese lineage, 
Ermanno Menichetti “Popo”. Picino took the lead and the race seemed to 
be over, but his sudden fall opened the way for Popo to won. Members of 
the Torre, convinced of Picino’s treachery, vented their anger on him. The 
police had to intervene. Picino justified himself by saying that he fell 
because of his silky pants, too slippery for the sweaty rump of the horse. 
Afterwards, a bloody brawl occurred between two Torre and two Oca 
supporters, where one man was stabbed to death. “Picino” did not 
participate in another Palio for four years.  
August 16th 1812 
Aquilla hired Piaggina; they had the best horse As soon as the rope 
(canape) was lifted, he was repeatedly jostled by Nicchio and Drago. 
Nicchio’s jockey fell from his horse, taking down Drago’s jockey with 
him. Piaggina kept running, but was soon attacked by other contrade, 
with the race finally going to Tartuca. 
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Table 2: Correlation table 
  Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Incident  0.04  0.19 1.00 
                     
Experience with Allies  2.08  2.93 0.01 1.00 
                    
Experience with Rivals  0.32  1.10 0.03 0.25 1.00 
                   
Number of Allies  3.21  1.22 0.07 0.25 0.07 1.00 
                  
Number of Rivals  0.52  0.58 0.15 0.06 0.34 0.24 1.00 
                 
Contrada Experience 226.78  85.19 0.09 0.00 0.13 0.05 0.38 1.00 
                
Contrada Previous Win  0.09  0.03 0.09 0.03 0.14 -0.05 0.33 0.10 1.00 
               
Jockey Experience  12.46  11.32 0.03 0.71 0.34 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 1.00 
              
Jockey Previous Win  0.11  0.16 0.03 0.14 0.08 -0.08 0.01 -0.07 0.08 0.21 1.00 
             
Affiliation diversity  0.66  0.28 0.02 0.45 0.19 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.06 0.61 0.16 1.00 
            
Family ties  0.08  0.28 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.09 -0.26 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.05 1.00 
           
August  0.48  0.50 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.02 -0.00 1.00 
          
July  0.46  0.50 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.89 1.00 
         
Extraordinary  0.06  0.24 -0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.24 -0.23 1.00 
        
Captain experience  4.86  6.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.22 -0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.11 0.03 -0.05 0.05 1.00 
       
Temporary Captain  0.03  0.16 -0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 1.00 
      
Captain Change  0.29  0.45 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.09 -0.30 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.11 -0.19 0.21 -0.03 -0.41 0.04 1.00 
     
Horse-specific experience  1.20  0.53 0.01 0.10 0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.14 0.11 0.16 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 1.00 
    
Experience with Neutral  0.52  0.28 0.00 0.10 0.01 -0.19 -0.10 -0.03 0.03 0.48 0.12 0.79 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.14 1.00 
   
GDP per capita ($)  5.38  5.83 0.02 -0.07 0.07 -0.37 0.23 0.81 0.02 0.05 -0.00 -0.07 -0.12 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.07 -0.11 -0.19 -0.01 0.03 1.00 
  
Population  39.21  12.68 0.06 -0.07 0.08 -0.22 0.32 0.96 0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.22 -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.20 -0.12 -0.28 0.02 0.01 0.86 1.00 
 
Court cases 233.73  62.56 -0.05 0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.07 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.07 0.09 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.05 -0.05 -0.04 1.00 
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Table 3: Logistic Regression of the probability of involvement in a conflictual episode 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Baseline Relationally loaded ties Mobility Rare event logit Logit with FE 
 
Coef se Coef se Coef se Coef se coef se 
                      
Experience with Allies     -0.09** (0.03) -0.09** (0.03) -0.09** (0.03) 
Experience with Rivals     -0.17* (0.08) -0.16* (0.08) -0.19* (0.08) 
Number of Allies 
  0.16* (0.07) 0.24*** (0.07) 0.23** (0.07) 0.40*** (0.09) 
Number of Rivals 
  0.92*** (0.16) 1.02*** (0.16) 1.01*** (0.16) 1.03*** (0.20) 
Contrada Experience 0.01** (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 
Contrada Previous Win 17.05*** (3.00) 10.92*** (3.20) 11.22*** (3.12) 11.10*** (3.11) 16.66+ (9.54) 
Jockey Experience 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 
Jockey Previous Win 1.21* (0.51) 1.11* (0.51) 1.08* (0.52) 1.11* (0.52) 1.04* (0.52) 
Affiliation diversity 0.29 (0.42) 0.19 (0.41) 0.26 (0.42) 0.21 (0.42) 0.24 (0.43) 
Family ties 0.20 (0.32) 0.18 (0.31) 0.19 (0.32) 0.24 (0.32) 0.20 (0.33) 
August 0.43 (0.31) 0.51 (0.32) 0.51 (0.31) 0.46 (0.31) 0.58+ (0.31) 
July -0.32 (0.35) -0.23 (0.36) -0.23 (0.35) -0.27 (0.35) -0.15 (0.34) 
1796-1848 1.90+ (1.08) 1.89+ (1.09) 1.83+ (1.08) 1.36 (1.08) 1.66 (1.13) 
1849-1907 1.60 (1.14) 1.60 (1.16) 1.55 (1.15) 1.08 (1.15) 1.40 (1.22) 
1907-1948 1.78 (1.25) 1.84 (1.27) 1.73 (1.26) 1.26 (1.26) 1.55 (1.34) 
Post 1949 0.97 (1.38) 1.50 (1.38) 1.39 (1.37) 0.92 (1.36) 1.47 (1.48) 
Contrada FE N  N  N  N  Y  
Horse FE N  N  N  N  Y  
Constant -9.29*** (1.22) -9.08*** (1.17) -9.49*** (1.18) -8.85*** (1.18) -10.77*** (1.49) 
           
Log likelihood -652.90  -627.17  -621.99    -599.94  
Wald Chi2 90.97  134.72  140.74    242.13  
Observations 4,597   4,597   4,597   4,597   4,399   
Standard errors clustered by jockey in 
parentheses          
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1         
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Table 4: Robustness analyses 
  Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
 Mobility types Horse match Captain controls Historical factors Heckman 
 coef se coef se coef se coef se Coef se 
 
Experience with Allies -0.12*** (0.04) -0.09** (0.03) -0.10** (0.03) -0.08* (0.03) -0.05** (0.02) 
Experience with Rivals -0.22* (0.09) -0.19* (0.08) -0.19* (0.08) -0.28** (0.10) -0.08* (0.04) 
Number of Allies 0.40*** (0.09) 0.40*** (0.10) 0.38*** (0.10) 0.34*** (0.10) 0.20*** (0.05) 
Number of Rivals 1.03*** (0.20) 1.03*** (0.20) 1.08*** (0.21) 1.16*** (0.22) 0.36*** (0.11) 
Experience with current employer 0.17 (0.23)         
Experience with neutral -0.62 (0.68)         
Horse specific experience   -0.10 (0.17)       
Captain experience     0.00 (0.02)     
Temporary captain     0.11 (0.54)     
New captain     0.56* (0.24)     
GDP       -0.12+ (0.07)   
Population       0.00 (0.09)   
Riot related court cases       -0.00 (0.00)   
Contrada Experience 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.02 (0.02) 0.00 (0.00) 
Contrada Previous Win 16.72+ (9.60) 16.80+ (9.52) 20.66+ (10.60) 52.06** (19.11) 7.99+ (4.44) 
Jockey Experience 0.04*** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.04** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Jockey Previous Win 1.06* (0.52) 1.08* (0.53) 0.93+ (0.55) 0.82 (0.68) 0.80* (0.37) 
Affiliation diversity 0.74 (0.68) 0.27 (0.43) 0.13 (0.43) 0.30 (0.53) 1.09 (0.73) 
Family ties 0.19 (0.33) 0.19 (0.33) 0.11 (0.35) 0.42 (0.68) 0.15 (0.16) 
August 0.57+ (0.31) 0.58+ (0.31) 0.52+ (0.32) 0.44 (0.31) 0.29 (0.18) 
July -0.15 (0.34) -0.15 (0.34) -0.35 (0.35) -0.49 (0.34) 0.05 (0.19) 
1796-1848 1.65 (1.13) 1.67 (1.13) -0.06 (0.84)   0.38 (0.43) 
1849-1907 1.37 (1.22) 1.41 (1.22) -0.36 (0.57) 0.64 (0.82) 0.32 (0.51) 
1907-1948 1.54 (1.34) 1.57 (1.34) 0.02 (0.37) 0.06 (0.63) 0.38 (0.59) 
Post 1949 1.46 (1.48) 1.50 (1.48)     0.39 (0.69) 
Mills ratio         0.01 (2.26) 
 
Contrada FE Y  Y  Y  Y  N  
Horse FE Y  Y  Y  Y  N  
 
Constant -10.78*** (1.49) -10.70*** (1.49) -9.56*** (1.66) -14.71*** (3.16) -10.00*** (1.84) 
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Log likelihood -598.99  -599.72  -549.17  -427.75  -3417.068   
Wald chi2 245.79  248.26  234.08  211.22    
Observations 4,399   4,399   3,591   2,422   4,597   
Standard errors clustered by jockey in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
